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Direct Elections to the European Parliament
by Dr. Peter-Christian Miller-Graft
The Act of September 20, 1976 will allow the representatives to the
European Parliament to be directly elected by the people of each Member
State instead of being selected by the national legislatures. The author ex-
amines the background of the direct elections issue and the implications of
this change for the future relationship between the new Parliament and the
other Community institutions. He explains how direct elections will broaden
the political base of the Community as a whole, and further the cause of
European unity.
T HE DECISION TO elect the members of the European Parlia-
ment by direct universal suffrage, rather than to permit the members
to be selected by the national legislatures of each Member State, car-
ries important implications for the future of the European Community
(EC). It would be an oversimplification to view the Community in terms
of a State Structure, as Hans Peter Ipsen, one of the leading German
scholars of European Community law, has repeatedly pointed out.'
However, the impact of direct elections can best be assessed through
considerations of theoretical concepts developed by the study of tradi-
tional state structure schemes.
Direct elections will almost certainly result in increased prestige for
the European Parliament. This will affect the separation of powers
between the various bodies of the Community, as laid down in the
foundation treaties.2 Further, direct elections provide an opportunity
* Research Fellow (Wissenschaftlicher Assistent), Faculty of Law, Tubingen
University; J.D. (1973) Tubingen University, Rechtsassessor (1974) Stuttgart; Research
Year, Cornell University, sponsored by the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes,
1969-1970; Assistant to the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Com-
munities, Brussels (1972). This article is based on the author's work, DIE DIREKTWAHL
DES EUROPAISCHEN PARLAMENTS (1977).
H. P. IPSEN, EUROPAISCHES GEMEINSCHAFrSRECHT 163, 187, 317, 973 (1972).
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of
Rome), done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]; The
Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, done Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140, [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty]; The Treaty Creating the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. __
[hereinafter cited as EAEC Treaty]. It is interesting to note that the language of these
foundation treaties substitutes the term "Assembly" for "Parliament." See EEC Treaty,
art. 4; ECSC Treaty, art. 7; and EAEC Treaty, art. 3. The Assembly, however,
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to increase the degree of legitimation of the European Community. As
the Community's institutions assume a greater role in the lives of
Europe's people, it becomes more important that the exercise of these
sovereign powers rests upon, and is perceived as resting upon a
legitimate basis. Since this basis has historically, at least in the Western
World, been seen as the expressed will of the people, direct elections
will provide a means of demonstrating the legitimation of the Parlia-
ment, and of the Community as a whole.
The resolution of the European Council in July 1976 approving
direct elections to the European Parliament, and the signing by the
foreign ministers of the European Community of the Act of September
20, 1976, concerning the election of the Assembly representatives by
direct universal suffrage (Direct Elections Act), caused strong public
reaction.3 This was to be expected in view of the fact that since the
founding of the European Community the direct elections issue has
assumed a key role in the development of European integration, as an
indicator of Member support for the creation of a European Political
renamed itself the European Parliament by a resolution of Mar. 30, 1962. J.O. COMM.
EUR. 1045 (1962). In this article, the terms "Parliament" and "Assembly" are used
synonymously.
For an assessment of the direct elections issue before the European Council ap-
proved such practice, see Allott, The Democratic Basis of the European Communities-
The European Parliament and the Westminister Parliament, 11 COMM. MKT. L. REV.
309 (1974); Zuleeg, The Parliamentary System and the European Communities, in
BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 110 (P. Dagtoglou ed. 1975). Detailed
material is contained in the Report on Behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on
the Adoption of a Draft Convention Introducing Elections to the European Parliament
by Direct Universal Suffrage [hereinafter cited as Report Patijn]. [1974-1975] EUR.
PARL. Doc. (No. 368) 74; Draft Convention, 18 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. C. 32) 15
(1975). As an introduction to the general role of the Parliament within the European
Community, see A. CAMPBELL & D. THOMPSON, COMMON MARKET LAW 80 (1962); B.
COCKS, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1973); J. LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND
COMMON LAW 12 (1966); Stein, The New Institutions, in 1 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE 51 (E. Stein & T. Nicholson eds.
1960).
The general context of the law of the European Community can be found in the
following works published in English: P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1973); D. LASOK & J.
BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES (2d ed. 1976); A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW (1973).
1 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) 1 (1976). The Act went into effect July 1978
after ratification by each Member State. Prior to passage of the Act, a Draft Conven-
tion was adopted by the European Parliament. Report Patijn, note 2 supra.
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Union. 4 The evaluation of the agreement and its contents varied accord-
ing to the direct different political hopes concerning European unity.
It is the purpose of this study to clarify the significance of the
Direct Elections Act in two stages: (1) by analysing the historical
genesis of the act introducing the direct elections, and (2) by
evaluating the perspectives opened by direct elections. When referring
to the European Treaties, the main emphasis will be on the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL GENESIS OF DIRECT
ELECTIONS
Initially, it is necessary to distinguish between: (1) the drafts of the
Assembly in the European Treaties, especially in the Establishing Treaty,
and (2) the actual development of the direct elections issue between
the time the Treaties came into effect in 1958 and the resolution of
the Council concerning the direct elections in September 1976.
A. Drafts of the Assembly in the European Treaties, especially in the
Establishing Treaty
Articles 4 and 137 of the Establishing Treaty form the basis of the
discussion.' These were introduced by the founders of the EC to in-
stitutionalize an Assembly as one of the bodies of the Community.
Political consensus of the founders established four institutions for the
activities of the Community; the Assembly, the Council, the Commis-
sion and the Court of Justice.' It was not by chance that this sequence
was laid down in the Treaty; the bodies were fixed according to the
ideal of functions which the classical theory of the separation of
See K.-H. NASSMACHER, DEMOKRATISIERUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN GE-
MEINSCHAFrEN 35 et seq. (1972); Zuleeg, supra note 2, at 110. See also COMMISSION
DES COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNES, RAPPORT DUE GROUPE AD Hoc POUR L'EXAMEN DU
PROBLPME DE LACCROISEMENT DES COMPftTENCES DU PARLAMENT EUROPtEN 61 et seq.
(1972); [hereinafter cited as Rapport Vedel] H. VON DER GROEBEN & MESTMACER,
ZIELE UND METHODEN DER EUROPAISCHEN INTEGRATION 22 (1972); H. P. IPSEN, supra
note 1, at 322 et seq.
I See the corresponding articles in the other Treaties: ECSC Treaty, arts. 7 &
20; EAEC Treaty, arts. 3 & 107.
6 In the ECSC Treaty the High Authority (Commission) is mentioned first,
ahead of the Assembly, Council and Court, while in the EEC Treaty and the EAEC
Treaty, the Assembly is mentioned first, ahead of the other bodies.
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powers7 had in mind: Assembly and Council as legislative powers," the
Commission as an executive power and the Court of Justice as a
judicial power. 9 At that time this represented a major foray into new
territory, both political and legal. Without creating a nationalistic
structure, the concept of state separation of powers was transposed to
an extra-state institution. This concept was applied to each of the
three former European Communities (European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, European Economic Community and European Atomic
Energy Community) which were later to be merged.
Institutional forms of international cooperation with bodies fulfill-
ing different functions had emerged at an earlier date. For example,
the League of Nations and the United Nations, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the Council of Europe were provided with
different institutions to serve mutual and national interests.' 0 However,
the traditional international organizations are based on a concept of
association of inter-state cooperation, which generally does not provide
for rights with respect to individuals, but directs measures only against
the Member States. Secondly, no judicial power is institutionalized as a
third independent body in the traditional international organizations.
The International Court of Justice and the European Commission for
Human Rights were created by independent foundation acts. Finally,
the European Community, created on the basis of international law,
differs from the traditional international organizations not only in its
internal structure and the objects of its authorizing measures, but also
by its extraordinary competence to perform denationalized public tasks
by using a public power of its own." This is why the Community has
' See generally R. HERZOG, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 228 et seq. (1971), for
the classical theory of the separation of powers.
I However, this theoretical concept does not correspond to the actual division of
powers between the institutions on a more concrete level.
9 A review of the constitutional powers of the Court of Justice of the European
Community is given by, Donner, 11 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 127 (1974). For the general
rule, see E. WALL, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1966).
10 For the basic structural elements of an international organization, see I. SEIDL-
HOHENVELDERN, DAs RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION EINSCHLIESSLICH
DER SUPRANATIONALEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 91 (2d ed. 1971). The result of the constitu-
tional convention of Philadelphia in May, 1787, was the draft of a federal constitution,
not a transnational cooperation agreement.
" For further analysis of this difference, see H.P. IPSEN, supra note 1, at 193;
see also E. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 34 (1958).
[Vol. 11: 1
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at times been called a pre-federal .association.12
Even now, more than twenty years after the founding of the EC, to
understand the Community in historical and political terms it is advisable
to ask what was the impulse leading to the creation of such a new institu-
tional structure for an extra-state organization. Looking back it is easy
to grasp that the European Treaties were not brought about by a
single motive but rather a host of factors.'" In order to answer the
question as to which political data helped to shape the aims and struc-
ture of the Community, it is useful to distinguish between the general
factors which brought European integration into being after 1945, and
the legal formulation of these aims which resulted in concrete political
endeavors of the European Economic Community.
Without any claims of perfection it is possible to distinguish several
basic impulses pushing towards institutionalized European integration
at that time. The effects of an international order of selfish and hostile
states on life, moral stability, property, overseas influence, position in
world trade and political rank of the European states, an order which
was eventually to explode its accumulated tensions in two world wars,
were catastrophic. It was this insight which gave force to those con-
cepts of an international order purporting to soften and abolish the
status of isolation resulting from a nation-states policy.' 4 This coincided
with differently motivated considerations concerning the future role of
the destroyed Germany. Western Germany hoped for political reha-
bilitation, equality and an increase in influence,' 5 while on the other
hand France, especially, emphasized the security aspects of including
"1 Scheuner, in 23 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN
STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 106 (1966).
" See Rapport des Chefs de Dlegation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres 9 et
seq. (1956) [hereinafter cited as Rapport Spaak]. W. HALLSTEIN, DIE EUROPAISCHE
GEMEINSCHAFT 9 (1973); G. WEIL, A HANDBOOK ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1
(1965).
11 This thought is clearly articulated in the Preamble of the ECSC Treaty of
Apr. 18, 1951:
Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential in-
terests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a
broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody con-
flicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a
destiny henceforward shared .....
See also C. FRIEDRICH, EUROPA-NATION IM WERDEN? 9 (1972); W. HALLSTEIN,
UNITED EUROPE 5 (1962); and W. HALLSTEIN, supra note 13, at 13; A. JUTTNER, DIE
EUROPAISCHE EINIGUNG 7 (1966); K. SAVAGE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON MARKET
14 (1969).
11 K. ADENAUER, ERINNERUNGEN 1945-1953, 295 (1965).
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Western Germany. 16 Simultaneously, the hegemonic extension of the
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe since the end of the war troubled the
Western European states and was considered a military, political and
ideological threat. It was the time of the articulated East-West con-
flict. 7
The United States also influenced the situation in two ways. First,
through the dependence of the Western European states on America,
and on its own internal development which appeared difficult to in-
fluence, and second, by the fact that the United States served as an
historical example of the successful integration of single states which
had been formed by immigrants coming from every European
country.' 8  This in turn was connected with an awareness of
technological underdevelopment as compared with the United States;
it seemed an almost impossible task for a single European country to
compete successfully because of limited economic and intellectual
resources. '9
16 This was one of the reasons for the proposal of May 9, 1950, promoted by the
French government in order to establish a common authority for the German and
French mining industry. See W. DIEBOLD, JR., THE SCHUMAN PLAN 9 (1959); W.
HALLSTEIN, UNITED EUROPE 9 (1962).
'" See Preamble of the EEC Treaty of March 25, 1957: "Resolved by thus
pooling their ,resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, .... "; C.
FRIEDRICH, supra note 14, at 9; W. HALLSTEIN, UNITED EUROPE 6 (1962); W. HALL-
STEIN, supra note 13, at 15; W. KITZINGER, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF EURO-
PEAN INTEGRATION 7 (1963); K. SAVAGE, supra note 14, at 43.
18 See C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 14, at 9 et seq.; W. HALLSTEIN, supra note 13,
at 5 et seq.; C. KAISER, EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1973); J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER,
LE DfFi AMERICAIN (1967); Gazzo, Allianz auf der Probe, Europa und die U. S. A., in
ZIVILMACHT EUROPA- SUPERMACHT ODER PARTNER 186 (M. Kohnstamm & W. Hager
eds. 1973).
It is generally possible to demonstrate that the creation, rise and institutionaliza-
tion of the United States have influenced many concepts of European integration. The
theories of American scholars, namely of E. Haas and K. Deutsche, also had their im-
pact on European integration policy; cf. Warnecke, American Regional Integration
Theories and the European Community, in INTEGRATION 1 (1971).
1 This consideration is spelled out in the Preamble of the EAEC Treaty of Mar.
25, 1957:
Convinced that only a joint effort undertaken without delay can offer the
prospect of achievements commensurate with the creative capacities of their
countries, [the signatories] [r]esolved to create the conditions necessary for
the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide extensive
energy resources, lead to the modernisation of technical processes and con-




Moreover, economic considerations also played a role. It was hoped
that by creating a large unitary economic territory, greater demand,
more efficient production techniques, a more varied distribution pat-
tern, and a higher standard of living would result.2 0 Furthermore,
organizational theories implied that a unified European Community
could provide more efficient solutions to inter-state public tasks by
shaping an infrastructure through common policy. 2 1
Finally, the dynamics of a movement toward European integration
among intellectuals and politicians, which had existed since the 1920's,
could be put into effect. 2 The worldwide shift in the balance of power
which had shaken the self-confidence of every European state and
which had broadened their horizons were motive enough to consider
anew the question of the existence and character of mutual interests
which had emerged from the common history and identity of the
European people. The movement toward European integration chan-
nelled the experiences and insights of that era into a concept of a
political order which would integrate the European states into a single
body, able to regain international power and prestige.3 In this period
of intense pressures pushing toward integration of the Western Euro-
pean states, the foundation of the European Economic Community
and of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) stand out.
Before that time, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
had been founded, but the idea of a European Defense Community
and a European Political Community had failed to get off the
20 See Rapport Spaak, supra note 13, at 13, et seq.; Preamble of the EEC Treaty:
Affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement
of the living and working conditions of their peoples, [r]ecognising that the
removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order to guarantee
steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition, [a]nxious to
strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious
development by reducing the difference existing between the various regions
and the backwardness of the less favored regions....
See also Preamble of the ECSC Treaty: "Anxious to help . . . to raise the stand-
ard of living .... " For the theory of the large market, see J. DENIAU, THE COMMON
MARKET 11 et seq., 35 et seq. (1962).
'2 See Preambles of the EEC Treaty and the EAEC Treaty. For the impor-
tance and perspectives of border-crossing cooperation in practical problems, see A.
ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS (3d ed. 1973); V. VON MALCHUS, PARTNERSCHAFr
AN EUROPAISCHEN GRENZEN 13 et seq. (1975).
11 A. JO"IrNER, supra note 14, at 11; A. ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 4.
23 W. HALLSTEIN, supra note 13, at 16; A. JCTTNER, supra note 14, at 19, 25 et
seq. ; M. PALMER & J. LAMBERT, EUROPEAN UNITY 23 (1968); Runge, Einfiihrung, in
DAS RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN (2d ed. 1975).
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ground.2 4 Since the more far-reaching concepts of integration proved
to be unrealizable and since the ECSC had been drawn up only for a
special economic sector, the foundation of the EC and the EAEC
represented the first real effort to begin the process of political integra-
tion by creating an integrated structure for the economy of Europe.
The basic concept can be summarized as the idea of political integra-
tion through the logic of economic integration.2 5 It is an idea similar
to that developed for the integration of Germany a century ago by the
economist List.
The objectives of the EC Treaty have been laid down according to
that principle. Article 2 of the Treaty contains a catalogue of objec-
tives for the Community:
1. to promote a harmonious development of economic activities
throughout the Community,
2. a continuous and balanced economic expansion,
3. an increased stability,
4. an accelerated rise in the standard of living,
5. and to promote closer relations between the Member States of
the Community.
Simultaneously, the instruments for realizing these aims are not open
to the discretion of the partners but have been fixed in two ways: by
establishment of the Common Market, and by gradual approximation
of the economic policies of Member States. In particular, the creation
and development of the Common Market as the basis of the Com-
munity has been regulated by stringent rules and provisions. Free
movement of goods has been guaranteed by the creation of a customs
union 6 and by eliminating quantitative restrictions and all measures
with equivalent effect between Member States. 27 Another provision
safeguards the freedom of movement for workers.28 Restrictions on the
freedom of establishment,2 9 on the free supply of services30 and, to a
lesser extent, on the movement of capital3 were abolished progressively.
24 For a discussion of the bases and the failure of those plans, see A. JUTTNER, supra
note 14, at 34 et seq., 54 et seq.; and Runge, supra note 23, at 2.
21 For the idea of the expansive logic of sector integration, see E. HAAS, supra
note 11, at 283 et seq.; and W. HALLSTEIN, supra note 13, at 21 et seq.
26 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 12 et seq.
21 Id. art. 30 et seq.
21 Id. art. 48 et seq.
21 Id. art. 52 et seq.
SO Id. art. 59 et seq.
11 Id. art. 67 et seq.
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Special rules were laid down for agriculture 3 and transportation.3 3 In
order to aid in the realization of these objectives, the common policy is
guided by rules governing competition,3 4 fiscal provisions,3 5 approx-
imation of laws3 6 and economic and social policy.37 These provisions
elucidate the aim of partial integration (i. e., of the economy) in a double
sense: national sovereignty is circumscribed by the aims of the
Treaty3 and a common policy within the Community and towards
non-Member States is envisioned within the concept of the Treaty.
Moreover, the preamble3 9 and catalogue of objectives underline the
hopes of the founders to develop progressively into a political union.
It is important to note that the special integration programme of
the EC Treaty deals not only with aims and means but also with in-
stitutions and political powers of the Community. Only the political
features connected to this venture of partial integration demonstrate
that an institutional structure inspired by the theory of separation of
state powers was created. The Assembly, renamed European Parlia-
ment some years later by its own resolution, was first in rank in the
system of institutions laid down in the Treaty. The function of the
Assembly, and the number and allocation of seats are regulated by ar-
ticle 137 of the EC Treaty.' 0 The Assembly, which shall be composed
of representatives of the peoples of the States united within the Com-
munity, shall exercise the advisory and supervisory powers which have
been conferred upon it by the EC Treaty. Therefore, the tasks and
powers of the Assembly are fixed and limited by the aims and provi-
sions of the Treaty. The Assembly has not been given the authority to
create or annul its own powers. A theoretical parallel can be seen in
the limitation of'the powers conferred upon national parliaments by
their respective constitutions. The procedure for access to the Assembly
is regulated by the well-known article 138 of the EC Treaty. In the
beginning, a method was chosen by which the delegates were ap-
11 Id. art. 38 et seq.
11 Id. art. 74 et seq.
14 Id. art. 74 et seq.
11 Id. art. 95 et seq.
16 Id. art. 100 et seq.
11 Id. arts. 103 et seq., 117 et seq.
38 For the problem of sovereignty, see H. P. IPSEN, supra note 1, at 227 et seq.
11 EEC Treaty Preamble: "Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer
union among the people of Europe .. "
40 The corresponding Articles are ECSC Treaty, art. 20; EAEC Treaty, art. 107.
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pointed by each national Parliament from among its own members in
accordance with a procedure laid down by each Member State,
without regard to the procedures adopted by any other Member State.
The number of representatives apportioned to each state is laid down
in a standard formula: the heavily populated states (Germany, France,
Italy) were to send thirty-six delegates each, the smaller states
(Belgium, Netherlands) fourteen each, and Luxemburg was allotted
six delegates. After the enlargement of the Community in 1973, Great
Britain was assigned to the first group, and Denmark and Ireland
formed a new group of ten delegates each. 4' Future development of
the means of access was laid down in article 138 (III) of the EC Treaty:
The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct univer-
sal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member
States. The Council shall, acting unanimously, lay down the ap-
propriate provisions, which it shall recommend to Member States for
adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional re-
quirements.4 2
Identical provisions can be found in article 20 (III) of the ECSC Treaty
and article 108 (III) of the EAEC Treaty. These provisions have been
criticized as being untrustworthy and for sticking slavishly to na-
tionalistic models which fail to take the pecularities of functional in-
tegration into account. 43 However, article 138 (III) of the EC Treaty
has played a dominant role in the discussions of integration.
B. Actual Development of the Direct Elections Issue, 1958 to 1976
During the first part of the period, from 1958 to approximately
1970, direct elections were blocked. However, the issue received con-
siderable attention. As early as 1958 a working group of the Assembly,
presided over by Dehousse, had begun to tackle the task of drafting a
proposal for direct elections. 4 In 1960, the deliberations led to a
resolution of the Assembly on a draft of an agreement concerning the
" See Documents Concerning the Accession, O.J. EUR. COMM. 849 (Spec. ed.
Mar. 27, 1972).
"' Wagner, in 9 DER STAAT, ZS. FUR STAATSLEHRE, OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 267 (1970); see also H. P. IPSEN, supra note 1, at 164.
43 H. P. IPSEN. supra note 1, at 325.
44 P6hle, in H. VON DER GROEBEN, H. VON BOECKH, J. THIESING, KOMMENTAR




election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. 45
Thus, the Assembly had fulfilled its part of the task by referring the
draft to the Council.4 6 In 1961, at a conference of the EC foreign
ministers in Bonn, the French delegation expressed its concern that the
time for electing the Assembly by direct universal suffrage was not yet
ripe.47 In 1963, the Council was formally asked by different members
of the European Parliament when it intended to enact provisions put-
ting article 138 (III) of the EC Treaty into effect. The Council
answered that the preconditions of unanimity on the question had not
yet been fulfilled.4 8 In 1969, the European Parliament formally urged
the Council, by a majority decision, despite the opposition of the
Gaullist party, to apply the procedure laid down in the Treaty to the
draft transmitted by the Parliament without any further delay. 49
Simultaneously, the Parliament threatened to submit to the Court of
Justice a complaint to the effect that the Council had violated the
Treaty in failing to act. 0 The complaint could have been based on the
assertion that an obligation to act had been violated by not determin-
ing the provisions as mentioned in article 138 (III) of the EC' Treaty,
although no deadline is specified for putting the provision into effect.
The complaint could have referred to the holdings of the Court of
Justice in other decisions that no provision of the Treaties had been
made arbitrarily by the founders; each provision is deemed to have
been designed to be put into effect within a reasonable period of
time. 5' In the Parliament's view, nine years exceeded the reasonable
term set for the Council to act on the draft submitted in accordance
with article 138 (III). However, even if such a complaint had been suc-
cessful it would not have had any great impact, since the Member
States are not legally bound to adopt the provisions recommended by
the Council under article 138 (III).
Several factors account for this period of delay. On the surface, the
decisive hinderance was France's repugnance. This was based on feel-
ings of national sovereignty and self-sufficiency in France strongly ar-
4' See Fir Allgemeine Direkte Wahlen zum Europdischen Parlament,
EUROPAISCHES PARLAMENT DOKUMENTENSAMMLUNG 24 (1969).
46 P6hIe, note 44 supra.
47 K.-H. NASSMACHER, supra note 4, at 41.
48 Id.
49 See EUROPAiSCHES PARLAMENT, supra note 45, at 268 et seq.
50 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 175.
1' P6hle, supra note 44, at IV(4).
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ticulated by General de Gaulle after the founding of the Fifth
Republic and the granting of Algerian independence. 2 The effect of
France's European policy is well known; e.g., the veto of Great
Britain's entrance into the European Community, the so-called policy
of the deserted chair, 3 the enforced practice of unanimity rule for
decisions for which majority rule was provided by the Treaty, and
finally the political label of a "Europe of the Fatherlands. 5 4 France's
reluctant attitude was only the accumulated expression of some basic
factors working against integration, not only in France, but throughout
Europe, which gained momentum after 1958.
The first factor was a renewed consciousness of national identity
rooted in the political considerations and practices of all Member
States and strengthened by the French example. At the time, this na-
tional consciousness was sheepishly articulated in Western Germany,
despite the declared reunification policy. The experiences and conse-
quences of the Third Reich, the war and the division of the country
had deeply shattered the belief in the meaningfulness of nation-state
schemes. However, the quick return of political stability and the
breathtaking economic accomplishments immediately after the end of
the war prepared the ground for the readoption of national impulses
such as those given expression by General de Gaulle in his famous
Ludwigsburg Speech in 1962.
A second factor hampering the course of integration has to be seen
in the unchanged national character of the political sub-structure in
spite of the formation of transnational, economic pressure groups. The
political parties remained exclusively organized on a national scale.
Similarly, the legal systems and the hierarchy of social values remained
separated by the national frontiers, and thus preserved, in the main,
their pecularities, despite the beginning of the approximation of laws
provisions of the Treaties.
Thirdly, energies working towards integration were absorbed and
disillusioned by the daily work in the EC, although the transitional
period prescribed by the Treaty ended quickly. The daily routine of
the EC was marked by the tangling of European idealism in the
meshes of technical specialties as contained in agricultural regulations,
5' A. JCTIWNER, supra note 14, at 55, 93 et seq.
5 Id. at 93 et seq.
14 As to the different stages of that period of French policy toward the European
Community, see A. JtTTNER, supra note 14, at 93 et seq.; E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 106 (1967).
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by the increasing financial burdens of a quickly spreading bureau-
cracy, and by the problems of agricultural overproduction as well as by
marathon sessions of the Council to resolve relatively insignificant prob-
lems. In the long run, those squabbles nurtured basic doubts about the
theory in which political integration was thought to follow economic
integration.
The resistance to direct elections was represented by the French
uneasiness with the idea of autonomous, legitimated political institu-
tions, independent of national parliaments, and perhaps capable of
usurping national power and authority. The discussion sometimes even
referred to an historical example, the inter-state conference at
Philadelphia in 1787 which resulted in the Constitution of the United
States.
The summit at the Hague in December 1969, marks the first shift
in the balance of political factors and arguments concerning the direct
election issue.5 5 Prior to that, several attempts had been made within
individual Member States to implement the direct election proposal.5 6
The idea was to put pressure on the French government by threatening
to carry out elections to the European Parliament by direct universal
suffrage on a national scale unilaterally. In 1964, for example, Social-
Democrat members of the German Bundestag introduced a bill con-
necting the forthcoming federal election with an election of German
delegates to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. The
bill was rejected by the existing coalition government of Christian-
Democrats and Liberals for political and legal reasons. A similar mo-
tion was later made by the CDU/CSU acting in opposition and was
then rejected by the SPD/FDP coalition. Similar motions were brought
up in Italy and Luxemburg in 1969.
At the Summit in the Hague, the direct elections issue was taken
up again. Acting in accordance with the communique, the Council
called upon the permanent representatives to work out, in collabora-
tion with the European Parliament, a draft for a treaty concerning
direct elections. 7 Concurrently, the Vedel Report dealing with the
problem of extending the powers of the European Parliament was
made public in 1972.58
K.-H. NASSMACHER, supra note 4, at 42; J. PINDER & R. PRYCE,
EUROPA-SUPERMACHT ODER ENTWICKLUNGSKONTINENT? 9 (1970).
16 PMhle, supra note 44, at 138/IV (5).
11 K.-H. NASSMACHER, supra note 4, at 42.
56 See note 4 supra.
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In 1974, the Paris summit decided to plan for direct elections in
1978; in 1975, the Assembly presented a draft to put article 138 (III)
of the EC Treaty into effect. Following protracted and lengthy negotia-
tions on single questions, especially in fixing the total number and
allocation of seats, the European Council reached a definite agreement
in Brussels on July 12, 1976. This paved the way for the decision of the
Council of September 20, 1976, to introduce direct elections to the
European Parliament. 9 This change in attitude toward the direct elec-
tions issue was caused by several factors. Beginning in 1968, the idea
of European cooperation was given new impetus although for slightly
different reasons.60 The intervention of the Soviet Union in Czecho-
slovakia in August 1968, kindled anew the fears of hegemony. General
de Gaulle's retirement as French President in the spring of 1969, the
topicality of the problem of world resources, and the threatened
danger of the so-called North-South conflict6 all had an effect. In ad-
dition, the internal political situation and the international role of the
United States in the face of violence caused by racial problems and the
psychological wounds resulting from the Indochina war caused increas-
ing uncertainty. Moreover, the end of China's political isolation since
1971, and its acceptance as the third World Power created both new
opportunities and new problems. Further, the permanent danger was
emphasized that some Member States, especially Italy, would drift into
economic and political dishomogeneity. Simultaneously, the problem
of neglecting regional powers and peculiarities by a rigid national
order surfaced explosively in some Member States. Political change-
overs took place on the Iberian peninsula and in Greece, and the
Member States of the European Community felt obligated to make a
common effort to assist in building new internal structures. The in-
terests of the small Member States in gaining more political influence
on a world scale through the Community was as strong as ever. Final-
ly, the original integration programme of the EC Treaty had been put
into effect in important respects.
These factors heightened the perception of the advantages to be
gained by the development of a common European policy in world af-
11 19 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) 1 (1976).
60 The differently articulated revival of original motives are evident in the con-
siderations of J. PINDER & R. PRYCE, supra note 55, at 77 et seq. (e.g., modern Euro-
pean economy; equal partnership with the United States; defense, but also dtente in
relation to the Soviet Union; modeling a new international order).
6' Hartshorn, Europas Ohnmacht: Die Abhdngigkeit vom Erddl, in ZIVILMACHT
EUROPA, supra note 18, at 131 et seq.
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fairs, which found expression in the greater political cooperation of the
Member States' foreign ministers. The first concrete success to result
from the renewal of interest in integration was the enlargement of the
Community by the addition of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland in
1973.62
A second series of developments also contributed to the increasing
interest in political integration: the experience of economic stagnation,
and, indeed, the perceived danger that the level of integration already
achieved might crumble away. The repeated levying of compensations
to protect the ability of domestic producers to compete economically
can be seen as a warning sign. This was a clear violation of the basic
community principle of free movement of goods. Above all, projects
which had been optimistically planned never succeeded in getting off
the ground. The Economic and Monetary Union 63 and the European
Union 64 remained in the design stages. These symptoms demonstrated
that the originally successful concept; political integration through the
logic of economic integration, had been too overloaded to efficiently
push the integration process forward. The "logic of economics," itself a
result of a selection between alternatives, collided with political con-
siderations of different origins. It became evident that these political
considerations were equal or superior to the economic goals and it
became necessary to choose between these alternatives, thereby pur-
posely selecting a policy detrimental to integration, despite the
economic arguments in its favor. No preponderant economic argument
had been developed which could convince the Member States to
62 See 0. J. EUR. COMM., (Spec. ed. Mar. 27, 1972); 7 GENERAL REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 449 et seq. (1974). See also K. NASS,
ENGLANDS AUFBRUCH NACH EUROPA (1971); J. PINDER & R. PRYCE, supra note 55, at
38 et seq.
A general survey of the legal aspects of the accession is given by Brinkorst &
Kuiper, The Integration of the New Member States in the Community Legal Order, 9
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 364 (1972). For the legal and constitutional implications for the
United Kingdom, see Mitchell, Kuiper- & Gall, Constitutional Aspects of the Treaty
and Legislation Relating to British Membership, 9 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 134 (1972).
6'3 See B. KOHLER & G. SCHLAEGER, WIRTSCHAFTS UND WAHRUNGSUNION FUR
EUROPA (2d ed. 1971); Everling, Institutional Aspects of a European Economic and
Monetary Union, 8 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 495 (1971); Maas, The Powers of the Euro-
pean Community and the Achievement of the Economic and Monetary Union, 9
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 2 (1972).
64 See generally Scheuner, Perspektiven einer Europaischen Union, 11
EUROPARECHT 193 (1976).
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transfer or steadily harmonize their rights of sovereignty.6 5 This can be
seen in the conflict between, on the one hand, the aim of integrating
the national economies as laid down in the EC Treaty, and on the
other, the sovereignity of national economic politics. For example,
while article 7 of the EC Treaty forbids discrimination against persons
of foreign citizenship in the procedure for awarding public works con-
tracts, 66 structural policy aims work in the opposite direction to foster
national and local industry.6 7 Thus, the inherent limits of the logic of
partial integration became evident even in the case of partial aims. 68
Reaching the limits of the original concept gave impetus to pro-
posals that advocated a direct drive to integrate the political sub-
structure, especially the separate, nationally organized political parties.
In a catch phrase, this meant political integration through the creation
of integrated political sub-structures. Thus, the cooperation between
the political parties in Western Europe and the interests of the dif-
ferent parties in European integration was increasingly in the
spotlight. 69 Different groupings have formed on a pre-political scale as
a result of the activities of the European Community. Numerous
pressure groups with a European structure emerged, mainly in the
field of agriculture but also in the fields of industry, crafts, banking,
insurance and finally among the trade unions.70 The formation of
these groupings on a Community-wide scale was an inevitable result of
the fact that the institutions of the European Community had been
empowered to take sovereign measures which would immediately affect
persons involved in any of the above-mentioned fields of the economy.
A third factor also heightened interest in direct elections. Starting
in the late 1960's, there was a marked increase in the frequency and
sophistication of demands that any 'political measures having direct im-
pact on people be based on legitimately democratic decision-making
65 Although some increase in the harmonization of foreign policy can be detected
(the so-called European Political Cooperation), see Report Davignon, 11 BULL. EUR.
COMM. 9 (1970).
66 Wigenbaur in KOMMENTAR zUM EWG-VERTRAG, supra note 44 at art. 7/1, II.
6' Regulations for state aids to the economy are laid down in the EEC Treaty,
art. 92, § III (b); see also J. LANG, supra note 2, at 293 et seq.
68 H. VON DER GROEBEN & E. MESTMACKER, supra note 4, at 18 et seq.;
Scheuner in BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 2, at 66.
69 See Zuleeg, supra note 2, at 114.
10 See C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 14, at 79 et seq. (industrial pressure groups),




processes. Measured by this standard it became obvious that the status
of the European Community was hardly acceptable even at its then
current point of stagnating and diminishing degrees of integration.7"
The Community's sovereign powers were not balanced by classical
forms of control and participation by a body composed of represent-
atives legitimated by direct election by the affected population. On the
contrary, the existing procedure called for a European Parliament
nominated by the national parliaments.7" In Italy, an even less
favorable variant of mediation was developed which permitted the par-
ticipation of the second chamber. In addition, the coalition govern-
ment claimed the right to participate in the nomination process. 73 This
raised the general question whether it was permissible to select the
delegation by majority rule and thereby confine it to members of the
government coalition, or whether the national delegation had to cor-
respond proportionally to the strength of the parties in the national
parliament. This in turn led to the far-reaching question of whether
the European Parliament was to be considered an extension of the ex-
ecutive or of the legislative power on a European level. No procedural
problems arose in the Benelux Countries and in Germany.7 4 The com-
position of the German delegation is adjusted to correspond to the new
proportions of the Bundestag after every federal election. 5 Correspond-
ing to the composition of the Bundestag in the 8th legislative period,
the present German delegation includes eighteen members of the
CDU/CSU, fifteen of the SPD and three of the FDP. In France the
composition of the delegation was negotiated by the factions of the two
chambers. In 1973, a proportional distribution was introduced. 76
These examples are sufficient to demonstrate the problem connected
with the old nomination system.
Finally, long and fervent discussions were held concerning whether
the first step in integration of the European Community should be the
increase of the power and competence of the European Parliament or
,' See K,-H. NASSMACHER, supra note 4, at 7, 35, 95, 155; Kohler, 26
EUROPA-ACHIV 727 (1971); Oppermann, Parlamentarisierung der Europaischen
Gemeinschaft?, in UM RECHT UND FREIHEIT 454 (H. Kipp, F. Mayor & A. Steinkamm
eds. 1977); Zuleeg, supra note 2, at 110.
12 For the different national procedures, see A. BLECKMANN, EUROPARECHT 32
(2d ed. 1978).
" Pohle, supra note 44, at 138/II(2)(c).
14 Id. art. 138/II(2)(a).
"6 Id art. 138/II(2)(b).
'" See Allott, supra note 2, at 313; Zuleeg, supra note 2, at 110.
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the direct election of its delegates. In view of the reluctance of the
Member States to surrender greater sovereignty, as discussed above,
the direct elections choice was preferred.
C. The Decision of the Council to Introduce Direct Elections
After long negotiations between the Member States, the factors
mentioned above eventually helped to form the decisions of the Council
concerning the Direct Elections Act of September 20, 1976." The Act
contains several essential points. First, the Assembly is to be composed
of a total of 410 representatives. Eighty-one are to be sent by Ger-
many, France, Italy and the United Kingdom each, twenty-five by the
Netherlands, twenty-four by Belgium, sixteen by Denmark, fifteen by
Ireland and six by Luxemburg.7" Thus a German delegate represents
approximately 763,000 people and therefore 13 times more inhabitants
than a delegate from Luxemburg, who represents 60,000 people. The
proportional figures for the other Member States can be fixed between
this range. The value of a single vote decreases as the population of
the Member State increases. The preference given to the small
Member States was inevitable in view of the population differences, if
no proportional extension of the number of seats could be effected. Sec-
ond, the representatives shall be elected by direct universal suffrage, 79
and shall serve a five-year term. 0 The so-called dual mandate, i.e.,
the simultaneous membership in both the European and a national
Parliament, is permissible.8 ' However, it is forbidden to be both a
member of the European Parliament and a member of another institu-
tion of the European Community, or of the government of a Member
State."2 The electoral procedure shall be governed independently by
each Member State.8 The European Parliament shall draw up a pro-
posal for a uniform electoral procedure,8 4 in order to abolish the
17 19 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) 1 (1976). For a presentation of the issues at
stake during the negotiations and their development, see Stewart, Direct Elections to
the European Parliament- With Special Reference to the United Kingdom, 13 CoMM.
MKT. L. REV. 286 (1976).
"' For the negotiations concerning the proportional number of representatives for
each Member State, see Bieber, 2 PARL. 226 (1976).
19 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) 1 (1976).
80 Id. art. 3, § I.
81 Id. art. 5.
85 Id. art. 6.
83 Id. art. 7, § II.
814 Id. art. 7, § I.
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unilateral national procedures in the future. Elections were to be held
in a prescribed period in 1978.85
The procedure designed by the Council to introduce direct elec-
tions was not in accord with article 138 (III) of the EC Treaty, which
postulated direct elections under procedures to be applied uniformly
by all Member States. The new article provides for simultaneous direct
elections in accordance with a procedure determined by each Member
State. This development of article 138 (I) without attaining the ideal
of article 138 (III) implies a revision of the Treaty 6 in the same way as
it is implied by the specification of a new total number and national
allocation of seats and by the provisions barring membership in both
the Assembly and other institutions.
In spite of the misleading formulation in the preamble to the
Direct Elections Act referring to article 138 (III) of the-EC Treaty, the
Council's determination cannot put these provisions into effect in those
Member States that have adopted them in accordance with their
respective constitutional rules. Rather, article 16 of the Direct Elec-
tions Act, in combination with the information clause in the preamble
make clear that the provisions enter into force only after being ratified
by all Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional
rules as laid down in article 236 (III) of the EC Treaty, and after the
formal notification of the Secretary of the Council that the procedure
has been followed. The failure of the election procedures of article 7 of
the Direct Elections Act to conform to the ideal of uniform procedures
contained in article 138 (III) of the EC Treaty reflects the over-all
failure to standardize sufficiently the national structures necessary to
support uniform procedures.
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE PERSPECTIVES CONNECTED WITH
DIRECT ELECTIONS
Two perspectives connected with direct elections will be the center
of attention: (1) The perspective of legitimation and (2) the perspective
of control. The question of legitimation is a legal problem, whereas
the question of control touches on the problem of political efficiency.
A. The Perspective of Legitimation.
Before assessing the legitimation perspectives manifested by direct
85 Id. Preamble & art. 9, § I. The election has been re-scheduled for 1979. N.
Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1978, § 2 at 3.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 236.
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elections, it is necessary to clarify some preliminary questions and to
analyze the present status of legitimation of the European Community.
Legitimation can be described in an abstract manner as the right
to act in a manner which affects other people. It may be generally
defined as the right to exercise power. For the lawyer, legitimation is
not only of interest for aspects of its real manifestations, which can be
defined as the description of the decision processes and the procure-
ment of consensus leading to the observation of regulations. This is
primarily a subject for political scientists, sociologists and
psychologists."7 Legally speaking, legitimation is also important in
demonstrating how basic values are realized.
Different basic values underlie different forms of legitimation. In
the field of private law, the competence of one person to act for
another rests on the legally recognized principle of private autonomy.
Exercise of sovereign powers, on the other hand, is historically
legitimated by the principle of democracy in each of the Member
States."8 This is sometimes expressed as the principle of peoples'
sovereignty. Exercise of sovereign powers also raises the question of
legitimation for the European Community. 9 While the Community
presently lacks etatistic qualities,9 0 there seems to be no good reason
why the democratic principle of legitimation, though developed on the
national level, should not be applied to the Community in view of its
specific sovereign powers, its own legal system, and its lengthy
catalogue of tasks and aims. However, it would not be necessary to
frame the legitimation structure and the division of powers in accord-
ance with state patterns. The possibility of developing new and dif-
ferent methods of legitimation, control and separation of powers
within the Community cannot be excluded. 9' This might even serve as
a model for states. 92
The appeal to peoples' sovereignty by the principle of democratic
legitimation as, for instance, expressly laid down in the German Con-
stitution93 is understood to be the expression of the common will of the
87 See 0. VON DER GABLENTZ, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE POLITISCHE WISSENSCHAFTr 55
et seq. (1965).
88 The concept of democratic legitimation applies also to Member States with a
monarch as head of state; cf. R. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 204, 264.
89 Cf H. VON DER GROEBEN & E. MESTMXCKER, supra note 4, at 14.
90 Cf. H. P. IPSEN, supra note 1, at 187.
91 Id. at 169.
92 Id. at 318.
91 GG art. 20, § 11 (1) (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany).
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people living in a given area. This concept is based on the idea of the
natural equality of all human beings, and thus, in view of the inherent
differences between people, on the idea of humanity. 94 The idea of
humanity means the willingness of the stronger to let the weaker par-
ticipate in state power on an equal footing with the dominant group.
On this basis, the question is whether direct elections can or will
increase the democratic legitimation of the exercise of sovereign powers
by the European Community. It goes without saying that the lack of a
standard of measurement obliges us to find an answer by assessing the
various aspects relevant to the degree of legitimation. The aspects of
valuation laid down in the following consideration are:
1. the type and scale of actions indigenous to legitimation, and
2. the structure of legitimation as expressed in the participatory
procedures which form decisions indigenous to legitimation. This
is exemplified by the number and types of intermediate partici-
patory procedures.99
At present, the state of legitimation in the European Community is
sharply criticized. Placard-like assessments, such as "deficit of legitima-
tion," "democratic deficiency" and "technocracy without legitimation"
are well-known.96 Showing whether or not these evaluations can stand
the test of rigorous analysis is the next consideration.
1. Type and Scale of Actions Indigenous to Legitimation
Actions indigenous to legitimation include all the sovereign
measures taken by institutions of the Community. These measures are
regulated by provisions of the Treaties which allot certain powers to
the Community. The powers of Council and Commission9 7 are par-
ticularly important because of their recurrent nature and wide scope.
The essential methods for exercising power are laid down in article 189
of the EC Treaty.
Regulations have general applicability in each Member State and
are binding in every respect. Regulations form substantive law. Their
coming into force requires only the publication in the Official Journal;
publication in the official journals of the Member States is neither
94 R. HERZOG, supra note 7, at 202.
91 Id. at 203.
96 See, e.g., K.-H. NASSMACHER, supra note 4, at 8: Kohler, supra note 71, at
727; Oppermann, supra note 71, at 450; Zuleeg, supra note 2, at 114.
11 E. POULETT & G. DEPREZ, STRUKTUR UND MACHT DER EG-KOMMISSION (1976).
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necessary nor sufficient. The national legislative institutions do not
participate. Regulations are self-executing, thereby creating actionable
rights for the citizen. 98 The organization of agriculture is a concrete
example of the scope and the significance of these regulations. The
total basic legal structure of the agricultural market is founded on
regulations which regulate and protect the different production sec-
tors, e.g., the market organization concerning cereals, rice, milk, sugar
and beef. 99 Thus, an integrated system involving intervention prices,
special measures, target prices, threshold prices and compensations for
exports has been constructed for the respective products. Another ex-
ample is Regulation No. 17 of the Council that completes the rules
governing economic competition within the Community begun by EC
Treaty articles 85 and 86.100
The Directive addresses the Member State as an entity. 0 1 Accord-
ing to the Treaty, a Directive binds any Member State to which it is
addressed as to the result to be achieved, while leaving the means and
form of compliance to domestic agencies. Directives oblige the Member
States to enact pre-determined measures through their own legislative
systems. Directives have been formulated in a specified and detailed
way to an increasing extent, thereby narrowing the scope of action for
the national legislator. Thus, notwithstanding the dispute on the ad-
missibility of specification, 102 the European Court of Justice has judged
98 See Marimex v. Ministero delle Finanze, (1972) Comm. Mkt. L. R. 907.
Leonesio v. Ministero dell' Agricoltura, (1973) Comm. Mkt. L. R. 343; P. MATHIJSEN,
A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 234 (2d ed. 1975).
" See Brandel, The Decisions of the European Court of Justice on The
Agricultural Market System, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 240 (1973); Happle, Die
rechtliche Grundstruktur der Agrarmarktorganisation, in EINFUHRUNG IN DIE
RECHTSFRAGEN DER EUROPAISCHEN INTEGRATION 276 et seq. (3d ed. 1972). For a
critical review of the Common Agricultural Policy see the Report of the Commission
in BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. Feb. 1975).
100 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 13) (1962); Schroter, in H. VON DER GROEBEN, H.
VON BOECKH, J. THIESING, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, supra note 44, at
811/IV; E. MESTMACKER, EUROPAISCHES WETTBEWERBSRECHT 2 (1974); for the anti-
trust law of the European Community, see J. GUYENOT & C. D'EVEGNEE, EUROPEAN
ANTITRUST LAW OF THE COMMON MARKET (1976); J. LANG, supra note 2, at 377 et
seq.; D. McLACHLAN & D. SWANN, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY (1967); Van Gerven, Twelve Years EEC Competition Law (1962-1973)
Revisited, 11 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 38 (1974).
101 See, e.g., A. PARRY & S. HARDY, supra note 2, at 61.
102 See H. P. IPSEN, supra note 1, at 458; Runge, supra note 23, at 26.
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that actionable rights can be established by Directives. 10 Directives are
primarily aimed at achieving the approximation and uniformity of
legislation envisioned by article 100 and other provisions of the EC
Treaty.10 4 This task involves abolishing any distinct national law which
impedes the aims of the EC Treaty.
Approximation therefore aims toward constructing an equal orl
comparable stock of legal provisions in the Member States, thereby
tending to harmonize the sub-structural "legal order." The Directives
concerning the approximation of company law may serve as an exam-
ple. 105
Other Directives concern the abolishment of restrictions of the free
movement of persons, services and capital, and the abolition of non-
tariff barriers to free trade. Directives have been worked out to
regulate such diverse fields as the reissuance of insurance, the film in-
dustry, the conditions of wholesale and retail trade, trade in pharma-
ceutical products and the free movement of professionals.1
0 6
The right to issue Directives represents an important opportunity to
advance further integration. This is due to the fact that the enactment
of a Directive implies the actual transfer of partial national legislative
power to the European Community. The Directive obliges a Member
State not only to conform its national law to it but also to abstain from
any independent regulations on the subject matter in question which
might deviate from the content of the Directive and bar its effect. 0 7
This injunction against national legislative change combined with the
lack of any power by a European parliamentary institution to initiate
such change could lead to torpidity.
The Decision concerns a single, isolated case. It is binding in every
respect upon the addressees named therein, who can be natural per-
sons or the Member States. The law of economic competition is a
105 See Spa S.A.C.E. v. Ministero Delle Finanze, (1970) Comm. Mkt. L. R. 1213;
Daig, in H. VON DER GROEBEN, H. VON BOECKH & J. THIESING KOMMENTAR ZUM
EWG-VERTRAG, supra note 44 at 189/II(4)(a).
104 See, e.g., H. P. IPSEN, supra note 1, at 686.
105 See Lutter, 10 EUROPARECHT 44, (1975); 1st Directive in 0. J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 65) 8 (1968).
"I For the different subjects of harmonization, see BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY
(Supp., Mar. 1975); id., Sept. 1972; id. Je. 1970; id., May 1968; id., Dec. 1967; id.,
Aug. 1966; id., Aug. 1965.
107 See Meier, 5 EUROPARECHT 332 (1970); Seidel, Die Rechtsangleichung zur
Herstellung des Gemeinsamen Marktes und der Wirtschaftsunion, in EINFUHRUNG IN
DIE RECHTSFRAGEN DER EUROPAISCHEN INTEGRATION, supra note 99, at 221.
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broad field for Decisions concerning enterprises. As an example, the
injunction against the proposed merger by the American producer of
packing materials, Continental Can Co., and the biggest Dutch com-
petitor, TDV, was based on the allegation that this merger constituted
the taking of an improper advantage of a dominant position within the
Common Market. 08  The fine imposed upon United Brands Co.
because of unjustified price discrimination for the same products in
different Member States in violation of article 86 of the EC Treaty is
another example. 0 9 Decisions referring to Member States are
numerous in the field of the free movement of goods. These concern
national measures with equivalent effect such as quantitative restric-
tions which try to protect internal economic sectors." 0
Other powers of Community institutions are expressed in recom-
mendations, opinions, acts of organization and financing, programmes
and agreements with non-Member States or international organiza-
tions."'I The competence of the Court of Justice is circumscribed in ar-
ticles 164 et seq. of the EC Treaty. Among the most important are the
powers of the Court of Justice to render judgments, to order the
suspension of execution and to make any necessary interim order." 2
Examples of Parliamentary action are laid down in article 137 of the
EC Treaty and its supplementary provisions. Finally, the Court of
Justice has held that the law created by the institutions of the Com-
munity has priority over national law, as does the law laid down in the
Treaty itself." 3 This holding is crucial to legitimation of the decisions
of the Community's institutions.
10 Decision of the Commission in 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 7) (1972).
101 Decision of the Commission in 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) (1976).
1o See generally Ehlermann, in H. VON DER GROEBEN, H. VON BOECKH & J.
THIESING, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, supra note 44.
111 See Runge, supra note 23, at 27.
"' EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 171, 185, 186.
"] See Costa v. Enel, [1964] C.J. Comm. E. Rec., 585, 593, Scheuing, 11 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 549 (1976), remarks upon the interesting resemblance of this decision to
Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed 60 (1803) both "in its strategic
significance and the tactics employed." See generally Bebr, How Supreme is Community
Law in the National Courts, 11 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 3 (1974). The Constitutional
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has taken a dif-
ferent position concerning the priority of constitutional fundamental rights over the
law created by the institutions of the European Community. See Bundesver-
fassungsgericht, May 29, 1974, case BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271, translated in (1974)
Comm. Mkt. L. R. 540 (Rupp, Hirsch, Wand dissenting). The decision has been
widely criticized, since the Court of Justice of the European Community had already
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2. The Structure of Legitimation
The above-mentioned placard-like assessments do not seem exag-
gerated when examining the role of Parliament in the institutional
structure of the Community as a basis for evaluating the present struc-
ture of legitimation. The limited palette of powers possessed by the
European Parliament is evident when compared with the rights to act
and organize inherent in democratic legitimation. Article 137 of the EC
Treaty states that the Assembly shall exercise those advisory and super-
visory powers which are conferred upon it by the Treaty. The content
and limits of the powers conferred by article 137 are briefly outlined.
One positive power conferred on the Assembly is the right to give
advice on the formulation of Community legislation such as Regula-
tions, Directives and Decisions. This advisory power, however, is not
granted for all measures of the Council and Commission by the express
terms of article 137, but by single provisions of the Treaty referred to
by the same article," 4 and by legal acts based on the Treaty. This
guarantees at least that community actions in more important cases
can only be taken after a hearing by the Assembly.
The procedure for Assembly consideration requires the following
steps. The Commission submits a formal proposal to the Council,
which is sent to the Assembly with a request for its opinion. The pro-
posal is referred to the competent advisory Committee by the President
of the Parliament. The Committee files a report on which a plenary
session eventually votes. This opinion is sent to the Council and the
Commission, but is without any binding effect." 5 Provision for a "con-
ciliation procedure" between the Parliament and the Council with the
active participation of the Commission was made possible by the joint
declaration of March 4, 1975. This procedure can be used for acts of
general application which have appreciable financial implications and
whose adoption is not yet required by virtue of acts already in ex-
istence." 6 The right to veto contained in article 95 of the Economic
taken steps to articulate and protect "the fundamental human rights enshrined in the
general principles of Community law." (See Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ty, Nov. 12, 1969, case 29/69, Stauder v. Ulm (1969) Eur. Ct. Reps. 507; Pescatore,
The Protection of Human Rights in the European Communities, 9 COMM. MKT. L.
REV. 446 (1971).
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 7 II, 14 VII, 43 II, 54 11, 56 II, 57 I.
uS P6hle, note 44 supra.
,6 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 89) (1975); 9 General Report on the Actitities of the
European Communities 14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as General Report].
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Coal and Steel Community Treaty (the so-called little revision provi-
sion) is an exception.
Article 137 of the EC Treaty refers to a second set of powers con-
ferred upon the Assembly; the supervisory powers. According to article
140 (III) of the EC Treaty, the Commission is obliged to reply orally or
in writing to questions put to it by the Assembly or by its members.
The delegates have made good use of this right."17 Second, the Com-
mission has to submit an annual general report under article 143 of
the EC Treaty. Finally, the Assembly can force all members of the
Commission to resign in a body by a motion of censure adopted by a
two-thirds majority."" However, the Parliament has no influence on
the nomination procedure of the new Commission." 9
The limited scope of powers held by the Assembly can be illus-
trated by comparison with the national Parliaments. There is no true
legislative power since opinions have no binding effect. The right to in-
itiate legislative programs is denied by the restrictive language of arti-
cle 137 of the EC Treaty, and no budgetary right in a classical
parliamentary sense is conferred. However, some efforts have been
made in this direction. The Assembly may determine its own budget
and since 1971, it has been able to participate to a greater degree in
making the budget of the Community. Since 1975, the Parliament has
had the right to set the dispositive part of the budget, i.e., the part
not yet fixed by legally required expenditures. 20 However, in the total
budget of the Community of 1976, this part amounted to only one
percent of the total sum. It was increased to twenty percent in 1978.
The Treaty Amending Certain Financial Provisions of July 22,
1975, provides for the establishment of a European Court of Auditors.
It provides for enforcing the budgetary powers of the Parliament in
three ways. The procedures for definite dispositions of parliamentary
proposals to modify the draft budget are reversed in certain cases. Un-
til now Parliamentary motions to change the budget were deemed to
be rejected unless explicitly accepted by the Council. The new treaty
'17 See P6hle, supra note 44, at 140/IV(2)(b).
... EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 144.
"I In the Parliament's history, only three unsuccessful motions of censure have
taken place.
"' EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 203, 203(a). See Allot, supra note 2, at 319:
Kapteyn, The European Parliament, the Budget and Legislation in the Community, 9
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 386 (1972); Scheuing, supra note 113, at 562.
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reverses the presumption so that motions which are not explicitly re-
jected are deemed to be accepted.
Second, under the new treaty, Parliament is granted the right to
reject the draft of the budget as a whole if there are "important
reasons." Further, the Parliament can demand the submission of a new
draft, and discharge the Commission with the implementation of the
budget.' 2
The Council is not subject to any powers of the Assembly. Accord-
ing to article 140 (IV) of the EC Treaty, the Council only confers with
the Assembly under conditions which the Council itself has laid down
in its procedural rules. This provision has been relaxed by the in-
troduction of the conciliation procedure, as well as by a resolution of
the Council concerning the cooperation of Council and Parliament in
the budget procedure. 122 According to the treaty, the Council is not
subject to any right of interpellation by the Assembly. The readiness of
the Council to answer written questions as displayed since 1958 is purely a
matter of custom.
The Parliament's nearly total lack of power vis-a-vis the Council is
not remarkable since the Council, being composed of representatives of
the national governments, 23 is the actual political decision-making
body of the Community. In view of the institutional structure con-
structed by the Treaty, the Council can be considered as the senior of
two legislative chambers. Thus, the Council represents the Member
States directly and is granted more powers than the Parliament, which
can be seen as the representative body of the European peoples.
Finally, the Assembly does not have any right to participate in the
appointment of members of the Court of Justice, unlike the German
and American legislative institutions which take part in the nomination
process to their Highest Courts. 2 4 According to article 167 of the EC
Treaty, the appointments shall be made by the governments of
Member States acting in common agreement. At present, the Parlia-
ment contributes little toward the legitimation of the exercise of
sovereign powers by the other institutions of the Community. Although
121 9 General Report, note 116 supra; European Community Bulletin 7/8 No.
2504 (1975).
122 Decision No. 3, protocol of the Apr. 4, 1970 session of the Council.
12 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 146.
114 For the Federal Republic of Germany, see FEDERAL BAsic LAW G.G., art. 94
(Constitution of the Federal Republic).
1979
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
it represents most directly the ideal of people's sovereignty, the Parlia-
ment is granted very limited powers to participate in decision-making.
Moreover, the Parliament has only a very weak authority to supervise
the activities of the Commission.
In addition, the legitimation of the Parliament itself has to be
taken into account. The appointment of delegates by national
Parliaments, and in some cases through participation by a second
chamber or by the government, injects an increased degree of in-
termediation and thus a decreased degree of legitimation as compared
to the selection of national Parliaments. Therefore, the allocation of
powers to, and the legitimation of the European Parliament indicate a
deficient state of legitimation in the Community.
However, a complete picture of the state of legitimation cannot be
gained merely by an assessment of the role of Parliament. What is
decisive is the shaping of the legitimation structure for sovereign acts
in the overall construction of the European Community, which must
be seen as a new form for exercising public and sovereign functions.
This perspective reveals primarily an institutional legitimation. The
creation of the institutions, and their allocation of duties and powers
has been ratified as part of the EC Treaty and the other Treaties by
the Member States, in accordance with their respective constitutions,
thereby incorporating them into their respective national legal orders.
In the same way, the new Members have ratified the exercise of
sovereign powers by the Community's institutions with their own stamp
of legitimation. In terms of international law the institutionalization
and structuralization of the European Community is based upon in-
dividual national acts of agreement and legitimation, these acts being
themselves legitimated by democratic procedures which are currently
in use for basic, political decision-making in each country.
Additionally, it is conceivable that the legitimation of sovereign ac-
tions of the Community rests upon a continuing flow of legitimation
from other sources. It is perhaps beyond the realm of possibility to sug-
gest that the Community's acts are legitimated by the concerted will of
the people of Europe. However, it is possible to envision the legitima-
tion of the Community as derived from the individual national
sovereigns. This relationship would not be expressed by co-decisions on
single substantive acts, but could be imagined as taking place through
personal lines of delegation and appointment from national holders of
sovereignty to the institutions of the Community. On the other hand,
the majority rule for Community decisions, the state of integration of
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the Commission, 2 ' and the possibility that the interests of a single
state might be overruled or be deemed irrelevant, and the impossibility
of drawing a line attributing any single action of the Community to a
single state legitimation create theoretical barriers. Fundamentally,
there is only the overall institutional legitimation of the Community.
However, there is no mechanism to require an accounting of the ac-
tions of the Community to a representative legislative institution. At
most, a government or a minister is called upon to account for only a
single act or decision which affects the Community.
126
Above all, the effort to find legitimation for acts of the Community
by derivation from the single national sovereigns fails in the face of the
legal and sovereign independency of the Community; sovereign acts of
the Community are not sovereign acts of the single states. Beyond the
institutional legitimation, decision by majority rule in all institutions of
the Community, and the special shaping of the decision procedure in
the Commission cannot be convincingly justified either by a single state
legitimation or by the sum of single state acts of legitimation.
Thus, the Community is not entirely without legitimation. However,
its present state of legitimation is fragile compared to the structures of
legitimation in the Member States. It is characterized by a high degree
of intermediation, a predominantly executive-determined decision-
making procedure required by the institutional structure and by the
failure to try to find parliamentary legitimation of community
measures by reference to the ideal of peoples' sovereignty. Thus, the
question of whether there is an additional need for legitimation in the
field of functional integration has to be answered in the affirmative.1 27
The background for an assessment of whether direct elections imply
a gain in legitimation is established. Proceeding on the assumption
that the actions indigenous to legitimation remain unchanged, despite
the proposals of the Werner Report concerning the Economic and
Monetary Union and the proposals of the Tindemans Report 28 concern-
ing the European Union, what is also unchanged is the possibility of
15 For a concrete example, see Graupner, Commission Decision-Making on Com-
petition Questions, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 291 (1973).
126 A well-informed study on the national decision-making process in European
Community matters is included in C. SASSE, REGIERUNGEN, PARLAMENTS,
MINISTERRAT, ENTSCHEIDUNGSPROZESSE IN DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT (1975).
127 This question has been posed repeatedly by H. P. IPSEN, supra note 1, at 163.
28 See note 63 supra; Tindemans Report, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY (Supp. Jan.
1976).
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deriving legitimation from the role of the national peoples in the
overall construction of the Community. Thus, a gain in legitimation
can only result from an increase in the role of the European Parlia-
ment.
Direct elections of the members of the European Parliament will
abolish in principle the existing additional degrees of intermediation
compared to the respective access procedures of the national
Parliaments. Clearly, this will result in a gain in legitimation.
However, even this increase in the degree of legitimation is subject to
different restrictions that contradict the ideal of a single procedure for
all representatives which would provide an equal degree of legitimation
for each of them.
Because article 7 of the Direct Elections Act assigns the determina-
tion of the electoral procedure for the first directly elected represent-
atives to the Member States, it can doubtless be expected that the elec-
toral procedures will differ substantially for representatives coming
from different states. Individual national procedures only accentuate
the principle laid down in article 1 of the Direct Elections Act that the
basis of legitimation is not the single sovereignty of the people of
Europe, but sovereignty of the various national peoples. Nationally dif-
ferent election procedures have a bearing on nationally different
degrees of legitimation of the representatives.
The various technicalities are irrelevant. However, all those
peculiarities of national procedures which lend different significance to
the single vote in each of the Member States will run contrary to the
integration ideal of equal legitimation and the principle of equality on
which democratic legitimation is based. Votes which result from
basically different types of electoral procedures will not be equivalent.
Conducting the elections according to the national electoral laws,
e.g., the first post system in Great Britain and the proportional system
in Germany, implies the simultaneous applications of totally different
voting procedures and of weight given to each vote. This difference
will result in a distinct composition of each national group of represent-
atives, and it will also result in disproportionate strength for some
political parties. For example, it is to be expected that the British
Liberals will be proportionately less represented when compared to
their total number of votes than will the German Free Democrats when
numbered by the proportional system. 29 Another form of diverse vote
" Bieber, 31 EUROPA-ARCHiv 707, 710 (1976). Mr. Bieber thinks that it is possi-
ble that the British Liberals will not be represented in the European Parliament at all.
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efficacy will result from separate national decisions on whether to apply a
condition requiring a party to gain a minimum percentage of the total
vote in order to be eligible for representation in the Assembly.
A third problem could arise from the various procedures of parties'
admission and from individual States barring candidates of parties
held to be unconstitutional in that State. However, this question will
not be of immediate interest until integrated European parties attempt
to run candidates throughout the whole Community; a possibility not
envisioned for the first direct elections which will be based on nationally
organized parties confined to their respective countries. The creation
of integrated European parties will most probably be preceded by a
uniform electoral procedure (according to article 7 of the Direct Elec-
tions Act) and thus the third problem might not arise at all.
The expected different vote efficacy is dealt with in article 1 of the
Direct Elections Act by recognizing the sovereignty of the separate na-
tional peoples. However, the idea of integration and the principle of
democratic legitimation would suggest the necessity of avoiding gross
disproportions of vote efficacy in the different national procedures,
even in the first direct elections. However, in the long run, the basis of
legitimation for the Community and its institutions may shift from the
peoples of the States brought together in the Community, as it is form-
ulated in article 1 of the Direct Elections Act, to the people of the
European Community grouped into single States.
The proportional system of national allocation of seats as laid
down in article 2 of the Direct Elections Act, and taken over in principle
from article 138 (II) of the EC Treaty, does not even roughly realize
equal vote efficacy. Judged by the standards of the ideal of integration
and of the principle of democratic legitimation it can only be justified
for a transitory period. The number of voters represented by a future
Member of Parliament varies between 60,000 and 763,000 which im-
plies institutionalized discriminations of vote efficacy along the line of
national borders. As national populations decrease, each vote is more
valuable. The allocation was the result of compromise between the na-
tional State principle and an agreed proportionality, thereby very
roughly taking into consideration the differences in national popula-
tion.
To solve the problems resulting from the disproportionate value of
the vote in the respective Member States, and from the intention to
limit the number of national seats, a concern felt especially by Luxem-
burg, better solutions must be found in the long run. The creation of
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regional voting districts crossing national borders, or a connected
Benelux system, or a minimum guarantee of seats for Luxemburg
alone would all be conceivable. However, realizing roughly comparable
vote efficacy need not mean that the smaller States will be swamped.
A system of minority protection has to be found. Moreover, equal na-
tional representation can be guaranteed by use of the Council as a sec-
ond chamber comparable to the American Senate. Countries which
choose to apply proportional election procedures to a pure party list
system will sacrifice a degree of the gain in legitimation which will
result from direct elections. Legitimation will flow more directly if the
proportional election procedure is used in voting districts. 3 0
Article 5 of the Direct Elections Act permits delegates to hold seats
in the national parliaments as well. However, the burden of executing
a national as well as a European mandate meaningfully and seriously
should make the dual mandate an exceptional case. Linking the Euro-
pean ideals to membership in the national parliament in a mandatory
way would obscure the distinctions between the two autonomous
sources of legitimation.
The City of Berlin is an exception to the overall scheme. Its
representatives will not be elected by direct universal suffrage, but by
the City Assembly (Abgeordnetenhaus) as originally decided by the
three Western Allies. If this special treatment is based on the principle
that Berlin is not governed by the Federal Republic, 1 3 ' and thus is not
subject to the procedures laid down in the federal law, nothing should
prevent Berlin's participation in the uniform procedure to be deter-
mined by the Community for future elections, the rights and powers of
the Allies notwithstanding. 132
Direct elections will -increase the degree of legitimation of the Euro-
pean Parliament despite the problems and restrictions discussed above.
A gain will be achieved by the fact that the citizens of the Member
States will cast a special European vote.
While the palette of powers of the Parliament remains as limited as
before, the possibility cannot be excluded that a Parliament elected by
10 Listing systems without electoral areas would forego unnecessarily the chance
of a more intense representation. For a British perspective of this problem, see
Stewart, supra note 77, at 295.
" See The Agreement on Berlin of Sept. 9, 1971, at II B and the Letter of the
Western Allies of May 12, 1949 concerning the BASIC LAW at No. 4.




direct universal suffrage will exercise its powers with greater resonance.
Moreover, it may succeed in having its powers enlarged by Treaty revi-
sions concerning the shifting of authority and competence within the
Community structure. The Direct Elections Act has already inspired
discussion of possible future developments. In Germany, the experts on
European policy in each of the three parties represented in the Federal
Parliament all see as the next objective the allocation of new powers to
the European Parliament. Biedenkopf, of the CDU, has suggested as
possibilities, a right to confirm the President of the Commission, the
right to initiate legislation and send it to the Council, the right to con-
trol the entire budget, the right to enact legislation in cooperation with
the other institutions of the Community and a qualified right to veto
decisions of the Council. Bangemann, of the FPD, has declared it
essential to accord to Parliament the right to initiate legislation, and
the right to participate in drafting a European Constitution. Friedrich,
of the SPD, has urged that the Parliament be given equality with the
Council in legislation, especially in budget and financial matters, and
in the election of the Commission.
Official proposals on a European level are presented by the Vedel
Report,' the Tindemans Report'3 4 and the recommendations of the
Werner Report.' However, it is not possible to examine these pro-
posals without considering the reasons for the time lag between the
ratifications of the European treaties and the passage of the Direct
Elections Act, as discussed above. The national discussions on adopting
the Direct Elections Act demonstrated the intricacies of progressing
toward European integration.
Three factors may be decisive in determining whether the powers
of the directly-elected Parliament will be enlarged:
(1) The relationship between the important national political
parties which will form the majority in the European Parlia-
ment, and the degree of consensus in matters of European
policy among them.
(2) The political importance of the future Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament in their respective home countries.
(3) The size of the voting turnout at the first direct elections. This
will help to measure the interest of the population of the Com-
munity as a whole in achieving European integration, as well
133 See note 4 supra.
M" See note 128 supra.
13I See note 63 supra.
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as identifying regional and national differences. Thus, the size
of the turnout can serve as an important argument for future
steps towards integration. The turnout will also depend upon
how convincingly and to what degree the national politicians
supporting integration have succeeded in attracting the atten-
tion of various groups to Community activities by appealing
to their special interests.
The Direct Elections Act does not change the fact that decision-
making procedures within the Community are predominantly ex-
ecutively determined. However, it provides an opportunity for an
increase in the degree of legitimation of the Community as a whole,
and may lead toward future integration.
Finally, it is possible to hypothesize an enlargement of political
control over the other Community institutions by a directly-elected
European Parliament.
This control may be directly exercised through legally institu-
tionalized forms and procedures, or may result from more indirect in-
fluences such as the Parliament's role as the forum for political discus-
sion.
At present the Assembly's control over the Commission and Council
is very weak. The analysis of powers demonstrates that there are few
legally institutionalized forms of control over the Commission and
there is no power to control the Council at all. This may partially
result from the fact that the composition of the present Assembly is
dominated by politicians who are less influential in national politics,
although exceptions do exist. Thus, the potential for the present
representatives to influence single decisions of the Council and Com-
mission through direct contact or by an appeal to national legislative
and executive institutions might be limited, despite the immense
achievements of some consultations. Thus, the control of the Council
and Commission is essentially in the hands of the executive institutions
of the Member States.
Direct elections present an opportunity for increasing the control of
the Parliament. A continuous, steady enlargement of the powers and
participatory rights of the Parliament is not unlikely to occur.
Simultaneously, the possibility exists of augmenting the powers by
universally accepted custom and by working to increase the willingness
of the Member States to revise the treaties to give greater authority to
the Parliament. This is more likely to occur if the question of the
allocation of powers among the Community institutions is kept
separate from the problem of the surrender of national sovereignty.
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The election of nationally influential politicians can be expected to
increase the influential capabilities of the new Parliament. It is already
known that Brandt, Tindemans and Strauss intend to become can-
didates. 136
The third factor which could increase the political control of the
new Parliament will be the possibility of forging alliances among na-
tional parties with similar political views to create factions within the
Parliament. The ongoing national structure of political parties in-
dicates that the traditional national electoral campaign will also con-
tinue with all of its attendant features, e.g., the nomination pro-
cedures for candidates and the formation of party programmes. The
possibility of cooperation among similar parties in different Member
States may allow for the development of a consensus of opinion on
policy toward the integration of Europe, and toward increasing the
power and influence of the Parliament. In the present Assembly,
delegates have already formed factions which emphasize political
similarities rather than national differences. For example, Christian-
Democrat, Socialist, and Liberal alliances already exist.' 37 Even outside
the Assembly, it appears that party associations of Christian-
Democrats, Liberals, and Social-Democrats are beginning to transcend
border divisions. 138
However, complete unity is made more difficult by the real
ideological differences which exist among parties with similar names by
the existence of competing wings within each national party, and also
by the presence of peculiarly national parties, e.g., the Gaullist Party
in France. 3 9 Formation of transnational factions can contribute to in-
creasing the degree of control of the Parliament over other Community
institutions. If the delegates choose instead to remain isolated in na-
tional party groups, or even coalesce into broader national alliances,
there will be two negative effects. Not only would the idea of integra-
tion not be furthered, but the opportunity for reaching a prior,
transnational commitment to increasing the control of the Parliament
over the Commission and perhaps, the Council, will be lost.
136 Bieber, supra note 129, at 713.
' For a more detailed treatment of the factions in the European Parliament, see
G. ZELLENTIN, EUROPA 1985, 95 et seq. (1972); ZUSAMMENARBEIT DER PARTEIEN
IN WESTEUROPA 412 et seq. (1976).
' See ZUSAMMENARBEIT, supra note 137, at 13, 143, 251.
13 .See M. BANGEMANN & R. BIEBER, DIE DIREKTWAHL-SACKGASSE ODER CHANEL
FUR EUROPA? 136 (1976); ZUSAMMENARBEIT, supra note 137, at 341 (problems of
transnational cooperation between political parties).
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While direct elections will further the integration of the European
Community by increasing the degree of legitimation of the Parliament,
and, indeed, of the Community as a whole, it is this opportunity for
transnational political cooperation which may be the greatest benefit
of the Act of September 20, 1976. Alliances between similar national
parties can increase under a commitment to the idea of a European
Political Union which can be implemented by concerted action in the
new, directly-elected Parliament.
